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NOTES AND COMMENTS

The court's denial of the requested equitable relief because a remedy
existed at law is not objectionable in the principal case as a blind adherance to procedure which postpones adjudication on the merits.
Rather, it is a question of fundamental power to hear and determine
probate matters. The right to dispose of one's property by will is not
an inherent or guaranteed one, but rather one granted by the legislature. 22 Nor is is an unrestricted right. The Clerk of the Superior
Court is given exclusive original jurisdiction in probate .matters under
the statutes.23 The court had no alternative but to dismiss the action
and the suggested course of action, while unusual, represents no more
than a liberal interpretation of the statutes to meet an unanticipated
situation.
KENNETHa R. HOYLE.
Unincorporated Associations-Capacity to Sue and Be Sued
In a recent case' the Supreme Court of North Carolina held that
under N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-97(6) (1943)2 an unincorporated association
could sue or be sued in its common name. Although the statute in
question does not expressly authorize this departure from the common
" Wescott v. Bank, 227 N. C. 39, 40 S. E. 2d 461 (1946) ; Peace v. Edwards,
170 N. C. 64, 86 S. E. 807 (1915) ; Pullen v. Commissioners, 66 N. C. 361 (1872).
"' N. C. GEN. STAT. §2-16 (1943); N. C. GEN. STAT. §28-1 (1943); N. C.
GEN. STAT. §§31-12 to 31-27 (1943).
'Ionic Lodge No. 72 F.A. & A.M. v. Ionic Lodge Free Ancient & Accepted
Masons No. 72 Company, 232 N. C. 252, 59 S. E. 2d 829 (1950).
"Any unincorporated association or organization, whether resident or nonresident, desiring to do business in this state by performing any of the acts for
which it was formed, shall, before any such acts are performed, appoint an agent
in this state upon whom all processes and precepts may be served, and certify to
the clerk of the superior court of each county in which said association or organization desires to perform any of the acts for which it was organized the name
and address of such process agent. If said unincorporated association or organization shall fail to appoint the process agent pursuant to this subsection, all
precepts, and processes may be served upon the secretary of state of the state
of North Carolina. Upon such service, the secretary of state shall forward a
copy of the process or precept to the last known address of such unincorporated
association or organization. Service upon the process agent appointed pursuant
to this subsection or upon the secretary of state, if no process agent is appointed,
shall be legal and binding on said association or organization, and any judgment
recovered in any action commenced by service of process, as provided in this
subsection shall be valid and may be collected out of any real or personal property belonging to the association or organization.
"Any such unincorporated association or organization, now performing any of
the acts for which it was formed, shall within thirty days from the ratification of
this subsection, appoint an agent upon whom processes and precepts may be served,
as provided in this subsection, and in the absence of such appointment, such
processes and precepts may be served upon the secretary of state, as provided in
this subsection. Upon such service, the secretary of state shall forward a copy
of the process or precept to the last known address of such unincorporated association or organization."

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29

law,3 the court felt that when construed with N. C. GEN. STAT. §39-24
(1943) 4 and N. C. GEN. STAT. §39-25 (1943)r this was a sufficient
expression of the legislative intent to change the common law rule. 6
However, upon rehearing of the same case the court reversed itself, 7
stating that N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-70 (1943)s precluded the former interpretation of N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-97(6) (1943) and that the common
law rule still prevailed except as modified by N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-70
(1943). This decision does not settle the question as to whether N. C.
GEN. STAT. §1-97(6) (1943) authorizes suit against an unincorporated
association in its common name, since the only question before the court
in the present case was whether an unincorporated association could sue.
If it were held that N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-97(6) (1943) authorizes
suit against all unincorporated associations, but that only certain unincorporated associations could in turn sue, there might be a question as
to the constitutionality of the statute. This question has not been presented to the North Carolina court, but in view of the fact that the
substantive rights of these associations are not affected and they still
retain their common law right of action through the members, it would
-'At common law an unincorporated association could not sue or be sued in
the association name on the theory that it was not a legal entity. Tucker v. Eatough,
186 N. C. 505, 120 S. E. 57 (1923), Note, 10 N. C. L. RLv. 313 (1932).
' "Voluntary organizations and associations of individuals organized for charitable, fraternal, religious, or patriotic purposes, when organized for the purposes
which are not prohibited by law, are hereby authorized and empowered to acquire
real estate and to hold the same in their common or corporate names: Provided,
that voluntary organizations and associations of individuals, within the meaning
of this article, shall not include associations, partnerships or copartnerships which
are organized to engage in any business, trade or profession."
' "Where real estate has been or may be hereafter conveyed to such orzanizations or associations in their common or corporate name the said title shall vest
in said organizations, and may be conveyed by said organization in its common
name, when such conveyance is authorized by resolution of the body duly constituted and held, by a deed signed by its chairman or president, and its secretary
or treasurer, or such officer as is the custodian of its common seal with its official
seal affixed, the said conveyance to be proven and probated in the same manner
as provided by law for deeds by corporations, and conveyance thus made by such
organizations, and associations shall convey good and fee simple title to said
land."
'Ionic Lodge No. 72 F.A. & A.M. v. Ionic Lodge Free Ancient & Accepted
Masons No. 72 Company, 232 N. C. 252, 258, 59 S. E. 2d 829, 833 (1950). The
position the court took was advocated by a recent note, 25 N. C. L. REV. 319
(1947).
'Ionic Lodge No. 72 F.A. & A.M. v. Ionic Lodge Free Ancient & Accepted
Masons No. 72 Company, 232 N. C. 648, 62 S. E. 2d 73 (1950).
s "...
Any and/or all unincorporated, beneficial organizations, fraternal benefit
orders, associations and/or societies, or voluntary fraternal beneficial organizations, orders, associations and/or societies issuing certificates and/or policies of
insurance, foreign or domestic, now or hereafter doing business in this state, shall
have the power to sue and/or be sued in the name commonly known and/or used
by them in the conduct of their business to the same extent as any other legal
entity established by law, and without naming any of the individual members composing it: Provided, however, this section shall apply only in actions concerning
such certificates and/or policies of insurance."
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seem that the states are within their authority in enacting such a
statute.0
The principal case does make it clear that the capacity of unincorporated associations to sue and be sued must rest on a specific legislative enactment. Since the final decision in the principal case, the
North Carolina General Assembly has enacted an amendment 0 to N. C.
GEN. STAT. §39-24 (1943) which allows unincorporated associations
holding real estate under that section to sue and be sued in their common names in actions concerning real estate so held. The effect of this
amendment is to overrule the principal case, but it still leaves the
majority of unincorporated associations without a simple method of
litigating their rights.
The inconvenience, brought about by the application of the common
law doctrine under modem business conditions has led to much legislation, altering more or less, the common law procedure. 1 Some statutes
provide for suits against associations (or partnerships) in the name of
the associations with service of process on the officers or other associates. Judgments under such statutes bind the association property,
but the individual property of those members who have not been personally served is not bound.12 These statutes usually provide for execution on the association property before proceeding against the individual
property of the members. 13 Their validity appears unquestionable. 14
A few states, however, have statutes which though somewhat similar,
provide for judgments binding individually even those members not
personally served. 15 The validity of these statutes is doubtful. Under
the authority of two United States Supreme Court decisions' 6 it would
seem to be a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment as to any person not a resident of the forum state; but
" See 160 U. S. 389, 393 (1895) where the court said, "But it is clear that the
Fourteenth Amendment in no way undertakes to control the power of a State to
determine by what process legal rights may be asserted or legal obligation be
enforced, provided the method of procedure adopted for these purposes gives
reasonable notice and affords fair opportunity to be heard before the issues are
decided."
'0 N. C. Sess. Laws 1951 c. 86.

11 The various state acts are classified and
CORPORATE ADVANTAGES WITHOUT INcORPORATION

discussed in detail in
542 et seq (1929).
ANN. art. 6133-S (1949).

WARREN,

TrEx. REv. Civ. STAT.
TEx. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 6137 (1949): "Every member who is per-

sonally served is individually liable for any amount of judgment not satisfied by

levy on association property,"

Sugg v. Thornton, 132 U. S. 524 (1889) ; Jardine v. Superior Court in and

for Los Angeles County, 213 Cal. 301, 2 P. 2d 756 (1931) ; United States Heater
Co. v. Iron Moulders Union, 129 Mich. 354, 88 N. W. 889 (1902).
' S. C. CODE ANN. §§7790-7798 (1942) ; VT. Pu.
LAWS §5720 (1933).
'0 D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 11 How. 165 (U. S. 1851) ; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S.
714 (1877).
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in a case in which residence of parties was not mentioned, the South
Carolina Supreme Court held that such a judgment was valid.1 7
The several states are not in accord as to whether these enabling
statutes apply to ordinary partnerships. Some of the statutes expressly
exclude their application to common law partnerships,' 8 and other states
have reached the same result by judicial decision. 10 Still others treat
a partnership like any other association and allow suits in the common
name.

20

A few of the state statutes have been held not to extend to nonprofit associations. 21 It would seem that the need for allowing suits in
the common name against associations such as labor unions and fraternal
organizations, would be as great, or greater, than the need as to business
organizations. Some states take this view and extend their statutes to
cover any unincorporated association, whether organized for profit or
22

not.

In view of the great need for a simple method of suit by and against
the many unincorporated associations that exist today,2 it is suggested
that the legislature enact a specific statute allowing suits by and against
such associations in their common names. The following statute is
respectfully submitted:
All unincorporated associations or orders, whether organized for
profit or not, may hereafter sue or be sued under the name by
which they are commonly known and called, or under which they
do business, and judgments and executions against any such association or order shall bind its real and personal property in like
manner as if it were incorporated: Provided, however, this section shall not apply to ordinary partnerships as defined in G. S.
59-124 and G. S. 59-36.25
J. KNOX WALKER.
17Ex parte Baylor, 93 S. C. 414, 77 S. E. 59 (1913).
Professor Warren in his
treatise, CORPORATE ADVANTAGES WITHOUT INCORPORATION at p. 554 expresses the
opinion that the decision in Ex parte Baylor would not have been sustained by the
Supreme
Court of the United States if the case had been carried to that Court.
18
DEL. Rzv. CODE §4676 (1935).
9
" Texas Land & Cattle Co. v. Molina, 258 S. W. 216 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924).
'0 CAL. C1v. CODE §388 (1941), Craig v. San Fernando Furn. Co., 89 Cal. App.
167,2 264 Pac. 784 (1928) (applies to partnerships).
Realty Trust Co. v. First Baptist Church of Haskell, 46 S. W. 2d 1009
(Tex. Civ. App. 1932).
" Deeney v. Hotel and Apartment Clerks' Union, 57 Cal. App. 2d 1023, 134
P. 2d 328 (1943); Herald v. Glendale Lodge, 46 Cal. App. 325, 189 Pac. 329
(1920).
23
And to avoid further piecemeal legislation exemplified by the latest North
Carolina
statute on the problem. See note 10 supra.
24
UNiFoRm LImn PARTNERsHip AcT §1.
2
' UNIFORm PARTNERSHIP ACT §6.

